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Abstract
Mathematical Theory of Evidence (MTE) is known as a foundation for
reasoning when knowledge is expressed at various levels of detail. Though
much research effort has been committed to this theory since its foundation,
many questions remain open. One of the most important open questions seems
to be the relationship between frequencies and the Mathematical Theory of
Evidence. The theory is blamed to leave frequencies outside (or aside of)
its framework. The seriousness of this accusation is obvious: no experiment
may be run to compare the performance of MTE-based models of real world
processes against real world data.
In this paper we develop a frequentist model of the MTE bringing to
fall the above argument against MTE. We describe, how to interpret data in
terms of MTE belief functions, how to reason from data about conditional
belief functions, how to generate a random sample out of a MTE model, how
to derive MTE model from data and how to compare results of reasoning in
MTE model and reasoning from data.
It is claimed in this paper that MTE is suitable to model some types of
destructive processes
Keywords: Approximate Reasoning, Learning System, Modeling Destructive Pro-
cesses
1. INTRODUCTION
The Dempster-Shafer Theory or the Mathematical Theory of Evidence (MTE)
[1, 2] shows one of possible ways of application of mathematical probability for
subjective evaluation and is intended to be a generalization of bayesian theory of
subjective probability [3].
This theory offers a number of methodological advantages like: capability of
representing ignorance in a simple and direct way, compatibility with the classical
probability theory, compatibility of boolean logic and feasible computational com-
plexity [4].
MTE may be applied for (1) representation of incomplete knowledge, (2) belief
updating, (3) and for combination of evidence [5].MTE covers the statistics of ran-
dom sets and may be applied for representation of incomplete statistical knowledge.
Random set statistics is quite popular in analysis of opinion polls whenever partial
indecisiveness of respondents is allowed [6].
Practical applications of MTE include: integration of knowledge from hetero-
geneous sources for object identification [7], technical diagnosis under unreliable
measuring devices [8], medical applications: [9, 10].
An important example concerning difference between implications of bayesian
reasoning and reasoning within MTE can be found in [11].
In spite of indicated merits, MTE experienced sharp criticism from many sides.
The basic line of criticism is connected with the relationship between the belief
function (the basic concept of MTE) and frequencies. A number of attempts to
interpret belief functions in terms of probabilities have failed so far to produce a fully
compatible interpretation with MTE - see e.g. [12, 13, 14] etc. Shafer [3] and Smets
[15], in defense of MTE, dismissed every attempt to interpret MTE frequentistically.
Shafer stressed that even modern (that meant bayesian) statistics is not frequentistic
at all (bayesian theory assigns subjective probabilities), hence frequencies be no
matter at all. Smets stated that domains of MTE applications are those where
”we are ignorant of the existence of probabilities”, and warns that MTE is ”not
a model for poorly known probabilities” ([15], p.324). Smets states further ”Far
too often, authors concentrate on the static component (how beliefs are allocated?)
and discover many relations between TBM (transferable belief model of Smets)
and ULP (upper lower probability) models, inner and outer measures (Fagin and
Halpern [16]), random sets (Nguyen [17]), probabilities of provability (Pearl [18]),
probabilities of necessity (Ruspini [19]) etc. But these authors usually do not explain
or justify the dynamic component (how are beliefs updated?), that is, how updating
(conditioning) is to be handled (except in some cases by defining conditioning as a
special case of combination). So I (that is Smets) feel that these partial comparisons
are incomplete, especially as all these interpretations lead to different updating
rules.” ([15], pp. 324-325). Ironically, Smets gives later in the same paper an
example of belief function (”hostile-Mother-Nature-Example”) which may be clearly
considered as lower probability interpretation of belief function, just, at further
consideration, leading to very same pitfalls as approaches criticized himself.
Wasserman [20] strongly opposed claims of Shafer [3] about frequencies and
bayesian theory. Wasserman pointed out that the major success story of bayesian
theory is the exchangeability theory of de Finetti, which treats frequency based
probabilities as a special case of bayesian belief. Hence frequencies, as Wasserman
claims, are inside the bayesian theory, but outside the Mathematical Theory of
Evidence.
This paper is intended to shed some light onto the dispute on relationship be-
tween MTE and frequencies. Section 2 introduces basic definitions of MTE. Section
3 clarifies the problem under consideration. Section 4 describes, how to interpret
data in terms of MTE belief functions. Section 5 describes a proposal of a model
for structuring n of MTE belief functions. belief functions. Section 6 shows how to
generate a random sample out of a MTE model of reality. Section 7 describes how
to derive MTE model from data. Section 8 is devoted to comparison of results of
reasoning in MTE model and reasoning from data. Section 9 indicates open research
problem not considered so far within the presented interpretational framework of
Mathematical Theory of Evidence.
2. BASIC DEFINITIONS OF MTE
Let us first remind basic definitions of MTE:
Definition 1 Let Ξ be a finite set of elements called elementary events. Any subset
of Ξ be a composite event. Ξ be called also the frame of discernment.
A basic probability assignment function is any function m:2Ξ → [0, 1] such that
∑
A∈2Ξ
|m(A)| = 1, m(∅) = 0, ∀A∈2Ξ 0 ≤
∑
A⊆B
m(B)
(|.| - absolute value.
A belief function be defined as Bel:2Ξ → [0, 1] so that
Bel(A) =
∑
B⊆A
m(B)
A plausibility function be Pl:2Ξ → [0, 1] with
∀A∈2Ξ P l(A) = 1−Bel(Ξ− A)
A commonality function be Q:2Ξ − {∅} → [0, 1] with
∀A∈2Ξ−{∅} Q(A) =
∑
A⊆B
m(B)
Furthermore, a Rule of Combination of two Independent Belief Functions Bel1,
Bel2 Over the Same Frame of Discernment (the so-called Dempster-Rule), denoted
BelE1,E2 = BelE1 ⊕BelE2
is defined as follows: :
mE1,E2(A) = c ·
∑
B,C;A=B∩C
mE1(B) ·mE2(C)
(c - constant normalizing the sum of |m| to 1)
Furthermore, let the frame of discernment Ξ be structured in that it is identical
to cross product of domains Ξ1, Ξ2, . . . Ξn of n discrete variables X1, X2, . . .Xn,
which span the space Ξ. Let (x1, x2, . . . xn) be a vector in the space spanned by
the variables X1, , X2, . . .Xn. Its projection onto the subspace spanned by variables
Xj1, Xj2, . . .Xjk (j1, j2, . . . jk distinct indices from the set 1,2,. . . ,n) is then the vector
(xj1 , xj2, . . . xjk). (x1, x2, . . . xn) is also called an extension of (xj1, xj2 , . . . xjk). A
projection of a set A of such vectors is the set A↓Xj1 ,Xj2 ,...Xjk of projections of all
individual vectors from A onto Xj1, Xj2, . . .Xjk . A is also called an extension of
A↓Xj1 ,Xj2 ,...Xjk . A is called the vacuous extension of A↓Xj1 ,Xj2 ,...Xjk iff A contains all
possible extensions of each individual vector in A↓Xj1 ,Xj2 ,...Xjk . The fact, that A is
a vacuous extension of B onto space X1, X2, . . . Xn is denoted by A = B
↑X1,X2,...Xn
Definition 2 Let m be a basic probability assignment function on the space of dis-
cernment spanned by variables X1, X2, . . . Xn. m
↓Xj1 ,Xj2 ,...Xjk is called the projection
of m onto subspace spanned by Xj1, Xj2, . . .Xjk iff
m↓Xj1 ,Xj2 ,...Xjk (B) = c ·
∑
A;B=A
↓Xj1
,Xj2
,...Xjk
m(A)
(c - normalizing factor)
Definition 3 Let m be a basic probability assignment function on the space of dis-
cernment spanned by variables Xj1, Xj2, . . .Xjk . m
↑X1,X2,...Xn is called the vacuous
extension of m onto superspace spanned by X1, X2, . . . Xn iff
m↑X1,X2,...Xn(B↑X1,X2,...Xn) = m(B)
and m↑X1,X2,...Xn(A) = 0 for any other A.
We say that a belief function is vacuous iff m(Ξ) = 1 and m(A) = 0 for any A
different from Ξ.
Projections and vacuous extensions of Bel, Pl and Q functions are defined with
respect to operations on m function. Notice that by convention if we want to combine
by Dempster rule two belief functions not sharing the frame of discernment, we look
for the closest common vacuous extension of their frames of discernment without
explicitly notifying it.
Definition 4 (See [21]) Let B be a subset of Ξ, called evidence, mB be a basic
probability assignment such that mB(B) = 1 and mB(A) = 0 for any A different
from B. Then the conditional belief function Bel(.||B) representing the belief function
Bel conditioned on evidence B is defined as: Bel(.||B) = Bel ⊕ BelB.
3. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We notice easily, that if the function m is positive only for sets with cardinality
1 then Bel is the plain finite discrete probability function. On relationship between
probability functions and bayesian rule consult e.g. [13]. As m sums up to 1 on the
set of sets of elementary events we may be tempted to consider m as an ordinary
probability function. But, as cited previously from the work of Smets, this view
contradicts the Dempster rule of combination of independent Bels.
In fact, probability functions give rise to some expectations, which cannot be
satisfied by a belief function. Generally, we feel that a theory of real world is
correct if we make initial observations, let run the intrinsic real world process and
the theoretical process on this set of observations and then results of both processes
coincide. Probability theory matches this expectation. If we model the reality with a
joint probability distribution P() and set a selection condition to membership in set
B, start a real world process generating independent events following distribution P()
and out of these events we strictly select those fitting condition B, and then within
those selected events we estimate a joint probability distribution P’(), then P’() and
P() are related (in the limit) by the theoretical model of conditional distribution
P ′(A) = P (A|B). The major trouble with belief functions is that no such frequentist
interpretation exists for them. Models criticized by Smets [15] and many other fail
to define such an interpretation of initial data, the process and the results as to fit
Dempster rule of independent evidence combination.
Smets and Shafer propose a simple solution to this problem: do not look for such
real world processes at all. MTE shall exist as an nicely shaped abstract object in
the space of philosophical thinking devoid of any practical meaning.
We propose here another way out. We shall insist on looking for processes
meeting MTE requirements and rethink the type of process governing probabilistic
reasoning.
4. A FREQUENTISTIC INTERPRETATION OF BELIEF FUNCTIONS
A detailed presentation of our interpretation is presented elsewhere [22].
Essentially, we assume (like in papers of Nguyen [17]) that each object of the
population has set-valued attribute(s). But unlike other approaches we assume that
objects are attached labels. Labels are subsets of the frame of discernment Ξ and
indicate which values are permissible for consideration for a given object. Then the
belief function Bel(A) measures for the set A the share of objects for which the
intersection of the attribute value of the object and of the label of this object (and
NOT solely the attribute value) is contained in A (m, Pl, and Q are easily derived
from Bel).
The idea of a label reflects subjectiveness within the framework of MTE. It
happens in the real life that community attaches vicious labels to a man remembering
only his weaknesses (which he surely has) and totally ignoring his virtues (which he
may possibly have). So the label of an MTE object may express a kind of irreversible
prejudice, or attitude, or belief of a community with respect to this object. We can
also imagine a process of medical diagnosis. An iniatal set of hypotheses is proposed.
Then various medical tests are run which label the patient with different sets of
hypotheses, and the intersection of those labels and the initial finding is considered
to be the actual ilness (though no single test may be possible to distinguish this
single ilness from all the other). Another type of labeling may be that of actual
loosing some properties an object had once upon a time. Someone qualified today
as a contemporary example good father, may loose this property in - say - 40 years
(He may die by then or be just a good grandfather). A match may loose its feature
as being able to light a fire etc.
The importance of a label for the MTE object is operational. Let us assume we
run a deterministic MTE ”selection” process procB as follows: if the intersection
of B, the object’s attribute value and its label is empty then we reject the object
from the population (negative selection, identical with a probabilistic conditioning
process). Otherwise we change the label of the object to intersection of B and its
pre-process label (this is unlike probabilistic conditioning where we leave accepted
objects unchanged). Let us denote by Bel’ the belief function derived from the
population obtained after the process BelB. It is easily seen that then Bel
′ =
Bel ⊕BelB = Bel(.||B).
We may also consider a non-deterministic family of such labeling processes
procB1 , procB2 , . . . procBk where independently for each object randomly one of the
processes is chosen with probability Pr(B1), Pr(B2), . . .Pr(Bk) respectively. Let
Bel denote the belief function from frequencies in the initial population, Bel” the
belief function after the run of combined processes, and Belproc shall denote such
a belief function that for j=1,. . . ,k mproc(Bk) = Pr(Bk). Then again is is easily
demonstrated that the expected value of Bel” is equal Bel” = Bel ⊕Belproc.
Let us illustrate the idea with the following example.
Let us assume that Mr.AX, Mr.BY, Mr.CZ and Mr.DT are major contributors
of (imaginary) Formal Theory of Formality (FTF). We shall evaluate their relative
contribution to the theory - just by measuring the number of publications. We
collected 100 papers some of which were written by a single author, some by several
of them. The overall statistics is presented in the subsequent table:
Author(s) Number of publications
AX 5
BY 15
CZ 8
DT 2
AX,BY 24
AX,CZ 11
AX,BY,CZ 20
AX,BY,DT 9
AX,BY,CZ,DT 6
TOTAL 100
fun/arg {AX} {BY } {AX,BY }
m 0.05 0.15 0.24
Bel 0.05 0.15 0.44
Pl 0.75 0.74 0.90
Q 0.75 0.74 0.59
The neighboring table shows the values of MTE measures for three sets of authors
consisting of : (1) only AX, (2)only BY and (3) both AX and BY.
Let us assume that we obtained a ”hint” from a ”friendly person” that Mr.DT
is in fact a fictive author of FTF. This information (”evidence”) may be captured
by the belief function Bel1 such that m1({AX,BY, CZ}) = 1. How to use this hint
? We may take the papers we collected, one by one, and delete Mr.DZ from the list
of authors of the paper, and if no author is left, we throw the paper away. After
such an operation we obtain the new ”statistics” of contributions:
Author(s) Number of papers:
AX 5
BY 15
CZ 8
AX,BY 33
AX,CZ 11
AX,BY,CZ 26
TOTAL 98
fun/arg {AX} {BY } {AX,BY }
m’ 5/98 15/98 33/98
Bel’ 5/98 15/98 53/98
Pl’ 75/98 74/98 90/98
Q’ 75/98 74/98 59/98
Bel’ be the new belief function for the new population. It is easily seen that Bel′ =
Bel ⊕Bel1.
Let another, independent friendly person give us another hint that also CZ is a
fictive contributor to FTF. But let us trust this person only to 70 %. This fact should
be represented by the belief function Bel2 such that m2({AX,BY,DT}) = 0.7 and
m2({AX,BY, CZ,DT}) = 0.3.
Let us consume this new ”evidence” as follows: we take papers (after last op-
eration) one by one, throw a properly biased coin (70% heads, 30 % tails), toss it
and on heads we delete CZ from the list of authors (and throw the paper away if
no other author is left) and on tails we accept the paper as is. The expected value
over ”statistics” of a process like this is visible below.
Author(s) Number of papers:
AX 8.3
BY 15
CZ 5.6
AX,BY 40.8
AX,CZ 7.7
AX,BY,CZ 18.2
TOTAL 95.6
Let Bel” denote the belief function after the second process. Provably its expected
value may be calculated as Bel” = Bel′ ⊕ Bel2.
5. MTE MODELS
It is usually (next to) impossible to represent directly a (joint) probability distri-
bution in a larger number of variables. E.g. 15 four-valued variables would require
1 Giga floating point cells. With MTE belief functions it is even worse. A direct
representation of a belief function in 15 variables with four-valued frame of dis-
cernment each would require 1 billion Giga floating point cells. Therefore in both
domains alternative representations are looked for. Within probability domain so-
called bayesian networks are used [23], exploiting conditional independences, where
the joint probability distribution is represented as a combination of conditional prob-
abilities of variables Xi on their direct causes Xpi(i):
P (x1, ..., xn) =
n∏
i=1
P (xi|xpi(i))
Within the MTE literature another kind of ”belief networks” is used, due i.e. to
Shenoy and Shafer [24]. It is so-called factorization along a hypergraph:
Bel = Bel1 ⊕ Bel2 ⊕ . . .⊕ Belm
where no requirements are put on the form of components Beli. This approach has
been criticized recently by Cano et al. [25] as - contrary to Pearl’s bayesian net-
works - these MTE belief networks don’t reflect (conditional) independences among
variables. Shafer’s conditional belief function cannot be candidate for a factor in
belief function factorization. Therefore they proposed a definition of (so-called apri-
orical) conditionality within MTE saying that Bel is a conditional belief function
conditioned on variables X1, . . .Xk iff Bel
↓X1,...,Xk is a vacuous belief function. They
require the factorization of a belief function to be in terms of such conditional belief
functions. However, this definition is counterproductive as for the special case of be-
lief function being a bayesian distribution the whole bayesian network may collapse
into a single node of Cano’s belief network.
We proposed therefore another definition of apriorical conditional belief func-
tion in [26] and demonstrated there that Shenoy/Shafer factorization cannot be
simpler than that into a belief network of ours.Apriorical conditional belief func-
tion Bel|X1,...,Xk reflecting conditioning of Bel on X1, . . . , Xk is any pseudo-belief
function satisfying
Bel = Bel|X1,...,Xk ⊕Bel↓X1,...,Xk
(A pseudo-belief functions allows m’s to be negative, but only so that respective
Q’s remain non-negative). We then define a belief network factorization of Bel with
frame of discernment spanned by variables X1, . . . , Xn as
Bel =
n⊕
i=1
Bel↓{Xi}∪Xpi(i)|Xpi(i)
6. GENERATING RANDOM SAMPLES FROM MTE MODELS
Generating a random sample from the bayesian network is a relatively simple
task. We have to consider an ordering of variables compatible with the partial order
imposed by the network. To generate a single object, we take variable by variable
following this ordering, look at values xpi(i) already assigned to direct causes Xpi(i) of
Xi and then we select randomly one of the values xi1, xi2, . . . , xini taken by variable
Xi with probabilities proportional to P (xi1|xpi(i)), P (xi2|xpi(i)), . . . , P (xini|xpi(i)) That
is, in a single pass we can generate one sample object. (All random selections should
be independent of one another).
It is not that easy with belief function models in general. To generate a single
sample object we have to assign it first the frame of discernment set Ξ, calling
this set O0. Then we take one after the other component Beli function (ordering
may be anyhow), eventually make the vacuous extension Bel↑i of it onto the frame
of discernment. Then we select randomly a set Aj ⊆ Ξ according to probability
distribution proportional to |m↑i (Aj)|. If at the time the object had the value Oi−1,
then we assign it a new value Oi = Oi−1 ∩ Aj. Should Oi be an empty set, then we
terminate the pass without generating an object (a failure). That is, within a single
pass we may or may not generate a sample object.
With pseudobelief functions the situation is even worse. The object is within each
step assigned a set and a mark + ore -. If the mi(Aj) of selected Aj is positive, then
the mark is left unchanged, if it is negative, then the mark is inverted. If within
the sample there are two identical objects with respect to the finally assigned set,
but with opposed marks, then they are canceled out. After completion of sample
generation process all remaining objects with marks ’-’ are canceled.
However, if the model is in terms of a belief network as described in [26] (see
section 5), then the problem of sample generation reduces to probabilistic case (one
sample object per single pass), however one has to keep track of ’+’/’-’ marks as
indicated above.
7. EXTRACTING MTE MODELS FROM DATA
One of major advantages of the belief network model proposed by us for MTE is
its capability to connect statistical independence from data with d-separation within
the underlying directed acyclic graph of the belief network (see [27] for more on this
point). d-separation property [23] means possibility of derivation of conditional
independence from graphical structure of dependencies. Several algorithms have
been proposed for derivation of belief network structure for MTE (see [22, 26, 27]).
Within the framework of DS-JACEK system [28] still another algorithm has been
implemented. It is a version of CI algorithm of Spirtes et al. (see [29]. CI algorithm
is known of capability to derive causal models under causal insufficiency. It has been
adopted for generation of bayesian networks [30], and later for MTE belief networks
[31]. The essential adaptation step for MTE is substitution of bayesian conditional
independence test with MTE apriorical conditional independence test. If we test
conditional independence of variables X and Y on the set of variables Z, then we
have to compare empirical distribution Bel↓X,Y,Z with Bel↓X,Z|Z⊕Bel↓Y,Z|Z⊕Bel↓Z .
The traditional χ2 statistics is computed (treating the latter distribution as expected
one). If the hypothesis of equality is rejected on significance level α = 0.05 then X
and Y are considered dependent, otherwise independent.
8. REASONING IN SHENOY-SHAFER AXIOMATIC FRAMEWORK VERSUS
REASONING FROM DATA
The crucial point of the whole effort of developing data model for MTE was to
provide a reference point for MTE reasoning engines.
An MTE reasoning engine calculates (Shafer’s) conditional marginal distribu-
tions from an MTE model and a set of observations. Several such engines have been
developed (see [24] for further references, see also [25]). Shenoy/Shafer method of
local computations for MTE, described e.g. in [24] works with hypergraph factor-
ization models of belief functions. It has been implemented in the reasoning engine
of DS-JACEK [28].
Conditioning for probabilistic databases is achieved in a simple manner. It is
sufficient to impose a filter (filtering expression, or select expression) and the calcu-
lation of marginals can be done on the physically same dataset just evaluating truth
value of filtering expression.
It is not that simple for MTE databases. Neither are MTE constraints deter-
ministic (they are usually non-deterministic) nor is conditioning just the matter of
selection. One has to prepare the physical copy of the database. Then take each
record case-by-case and apply the same procedure as when generating a random
sample with two differences: we do not start with assignment of Ξ to the object, but
rather start with its currently assigned set of values. Then we do not use Bels de-
scribing the model but rather the ones describing constraints (observations). So the
record may be either discarded from the database or retained but changed (Due to
possibilities of changes we just require that a physical copy of the original database
is to be prepared for the process). Then marginals over the modified copy are just
results of MTE reasoning from data.
It is a very important issue to possess two different mechanisms for MTE rea-
soning: one from model and one from data. We may have diverse testing conditions
where we may utilize them in suitable way. On the one hand we may have a model
of reality available and want to develop/test a new/old MTE reasoning engine. It
is usually to hard to verify results of MTE reasoning for models with more than
10 variables by hand. And usually the implementation of sample generator in com-
bination with sample constraint imposer is much simpler than that of a fine (time
and/or space saving) model-based MTE reasoning engine. So we can generate a
random sample from the model, run reasoning both via sample constraint imposer
and via the developed knowledge-based reasoning engine and then compare resulting
(aposterioric) conditional belief functions from data and from the model.
The other setting may be that we have data available and want to develop the proper
model of reality. We may generate model from data either by automatic learning
program, or in interactive manner or by ”enlightened guess”. Then we can compare
under various constrains the results of reasoning from this model and the data and
eventually reject or adjust the model, change/improve model generation algorithms
etc..
Last not least, we may have been provided with a model once upon the time and it
was not until later that we collected a sufficient amount of data to verify its thorough
or partial validity.
9. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
The frequentistic interpretation of Mathematical Theory of Evidence described
in this paper has been fully implemented: major part of it within a knowledge-
base development-and-test system DS-JACEK and partially within the test-bed for
this system. For sparsely connected networks of up to 15 dempsterian variables,
databases with up to 5,000 cases were randomly generated and thereafter in most
cases successfully reconstructed using methodology described above. Cases of failure
turned out usually to provide alternative but functionally equivalent structure. Run-
times on an PC i486, 66MHz in extreme cases didn’t exceed 10 minutes.
Generation of random dempsterian samples served also as a test-bed for the
reasoning machine of DS-JACEK. Following of test examples with more than 10
variables by hand may prove not feasible. Hence for larger MTE models random
samples of 10,000 cases and more were generated and then results of knowledge-based
DS-JACEK reasoning machine were compared with marginals from a sample-based
test-bed reasoning machine. Comparisons of this form proved to be quite useful for
program development.
With this presentation main application problems of MTE seem to be overcome.
Processes changing data in a coherent way (reducing the space of possibilities for
each individual) like those of stepwise medical diagnosis, or destructive processes
have been identified as a class of processes which can be modeled using Mathematical
Theory of Evidence. Belief functions may be calculated from data, verified against
data and may serve as source for random generation of data. Independence of
dempsterian-shaferian variables acquired statistical meaning. A new category of
MTE belief networks has been defined paralleling bayesian belief networks in their
capability to capture qualitatively independence and conditional independence in
form of a directed acyclic graphs. Algorithms to decompose a data grounded belief
function into a belief network have been elaborated.
A number of questions are still left open. :
• how to interpret (if at all) pseudo-belief functions (that is with negative masses
in basic probability assignment),
• how to obtain unbiased estimates of apriorical conditional belief functions
weighing belief network nodes,
• how to accomplish statistically optimal approximations of belief functions by
belief networks from noisy data,
• what should be optimal independence and conditional independence tests for
belief network models.
These questions along with related issues are subject of further research. It is
due to the work presented in this paper that questions of statistical estimations
within the MTE may be posed at all.
Previous work, done among other by Shafer [21] by Kyburg [12], Halpern and
Fagin [13], Fagin and Halpern [16, 14], Pearl [33], Grzymala-Busse [34], Nguyen [17],
as well as critical evaluations of these approaches e.g. by Smets [15], contributed
to clarification of similarities and dissimilarities between frequentistic approaches to
probability and to MTE. The major contribution of this paper is to pinpoint the
essential difference between probabilistic reasoning and the reasoning within MTE.
Probabilistic reasoning can be understood - in terms of objects of the population
- as a selection of objects with some properties. Whereas MTE reasoning means
selection of objects combined with destruction of some of their properties. So,
objects subject to a ”probabilistic process” are the same before and after completion
of the process. Whereas objects subject to an MTE process are changed, deformed
after completion of the process. I think this explains difficulties encountered by
alternative frequentistic interpretations of MTE presented in the literature. This
fundamental insight allowed for enhancement of MTE with many features reserved
so far for probabilistic models only (like representation in terms of a belief network,
generation of random samples from belief function models, identification of belief
networks from data, comparison of model-based and data-based reasoning etc.).
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